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The Fourth Amendment in Your Shower: Naperville, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy, and the Intimate Nature of Electric Smart 
Meter Data* 
Electric smart meters are touted by energy experts as incredibly helpful tools for 
increasing the responsiveness and efficiency of the electricity grid by predicting 
consumer usage in a real time manner. However, real time responses require 
real time reporting, meaning that smart meters are documenting the movements 
and activities of every consumer connected to them. Whether someone prefers to 
take a shower at night, whether they were home on a particular day, or even 
what movie they were watching a year ago—this information is readily 
accessible to any trained eye with access to a consumer’s smart meter data, and 
law enforcement agencies are taking notice of its potentially limitless benefits in 
criminal cases.  
As smart meters become more ubiquitous, Fourth Amendment concerns are 
heightened. In 2018, the Seventh Circuit addressed this burgeoning sphere of 
privacy concerns in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of 
Naperville. The court acknowledged that smart meter data collection by a 
government-run utility constitutes a search—but a reasonable one, nevertheless. 
This Recent Development argues that the Seventh Circuit both downplayed the 
invasiveness of electric smart meter data and its potential criminal implications 
and overlooked significant Supreme Court precedent by failing to address the 
fact that smart meter data encroaches on the most protected sphere in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence—the home. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s other 
fundamental flaw was dismissing an element of smart meter data collection that 
makes it particularly dangerous—its ability to collect hundreds of thousands of 
data points over time, providing those who access the data a wealth of 
information otherwise unknowable via any other traditional search tool.  
This Recent Development asserts that these oversights were critical. The nature 
of smart meter data collection embodies some of the most fundamental concerns 
in Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence. The sheer invasiveness of 
unfettered data access warrants a bright-line rule against individualized, 
granular data collection by government agencies—including government-owned 
utilities—absent a warrant or consent. Importantly, this solution poses minimal 
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burdens on government-run utilities, as there are various tools available to 
protect consumer privacy without compromising grid resiliency. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last 250 years, what began as Benjamin Franklin’s single filament 
light bulb has evolved into a complex, electrical grid. This grid, powered by 
massive power plants, is able to respond to demand almost instantaneously. 
Electricity is an essential resource in nearly every facet of life, from global 
manufacturing and production industries to the most intimate and personal 
activities we engage in. Life in the twenty-first century necessitates 
interconnectedness with the electrical grid in every aspect of our lives. 
However, as electricity infiltrates every crevice of American society, the 
demands of a modern grid system, privacy principles, and the Fourth 
Amendment are on a collision course, and courts have deferred their obligation 
to prevent this train wreck. 
In Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 1 the Seventh 
Circuit addressed an emerging area of data privacy concern—electric smart 
meters. Particularly, it considered whether a city-owned utility’s use of these 
meters constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.2 The 
court determined that the data collection did constitute a search—but a 
reasonable one. When balancing the “intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government 
interests,”3 the court found that the value of the data collection in ensuring a 
reliable electricity grid outweighed a customer’s privacy interests.4 Critically, 
the court determined that the data was collected with “no prosecutorial intent.”5 
According to the Seventh Circuit, the data collection lacked criminal 
implications, so the privacy interests were less significant than privacy interests 
in prior Fourth Amendment cases.6 
However, this conclusion of reasonableness failed to account for central 
elements of smart meter data usage that pose a greater risk than the court 
implied—namely where the search occurs and how often it is conducted. This 
Recent Development explores how the Naperville court downplayed the gravity 
of an individual’s privacy interests in establishing the reasonableness of the 
search. It then advocates for a bright-line rule that prohibits governmental 
access to granular, individually identifiable data absent a warrant or consent. A 
judicial view of electricity data that fully contemplates the potential dangers of 
 
 1. 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 2. Id. at 525. 
 3. Id. at 528 (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004)). 
 4. Id. at 529. 
 5. Id. at 528. 
 6. Id. 
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unbridled governmental access—irrespective of prosecutorial intent—can 
simultaneously respect the growing governmental need for such data, while also 
shielding individuals from surveillance-state fears. 
Analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I explores the intersection of Fourth 
Amendment analysis and privacy law amid the proliferation of digitized 
information. Part II provides background on the advent of electric smart meters 
and their role in the modern electricity system, as well as the Naperville decision 
and its reasonableness conclusion. Part III explains why Naperville’s 
“prosecutorial intent” inquiry minimized the constitutional concerns associated 
with the search. Part IV identifies two main areas in which Naperville fell short 
in its analysis—failing to consider the significance of searches within the home 
and downplaying the heightened privacy implications involved in longitudinal 
searches. Part V proposes a bright-line judicial rule for governmental data 
collection within the home. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES AND PRIVACY 
CONCERNS 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable 
searches by the government. 7  However, as society has evolved, so has the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of what constitutes a search. The Fourth 
Amendment was originally based on a common-law trespass theory, meaning 
that a search had to involve a physical invasion on a constitutionally protected 
space. 8  However, Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States 9 
facilitated an additional lens through which courts began viewing searches10—
whether a search violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”11 This 
additional analytical aspect recognizes that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places”12 and that technological innovation allows the government 
to intrude on “areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes.”13 This test has 
become commonplace when courts evaluate whether the government’s actions 
constituted a search. 14  It asks (1) whether the individual had a reasonable 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 8. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). 
 9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 10. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added 
to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”). 
 11. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 12. Id. at 351 (majority opinion). 
 13. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018). 
 14. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (referencing the common-law 
tradition of respecting the interior of homes as private to conclude that thermal imaging directed at the 
defendant’s home violated the defendant’s expectation of privacy); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 
(1989) (finding the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a greenhouse visible 
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expectation of privacy and (2) if society is willing to recognize that 
expectation. 15  The reasonable expectation of privacy test has been used to 
evaluate whether the use of numerous technological devices constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment, including GPS monitoring,16 thermal-imaging 
tools,17 and cell-site data.18 
In 2010, the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard19 introduced the idea 
that privacy concerns are heightened when a search is conducted on a 
continuous, rather than discrete, basis.20 In Maynard, police placed a tracking 
device on the defendant’s car for twenty-eight days, continuously collecting 
information on his whereabouts without a warrant.21 In evaluating the strength 
of the defendant’s privacy interests, the court held that the continuous nature 
of the data collection was distinct because it equated to an aggregation of 
searches rather than an individualized search.22 The D.C. Circuit then noted 
that a reasonable person “expects each of those movements to remain 
‘disconnected and anonymous.’”23 
The Supreme Court later affirmed Maynard in United States v. Jones,24 but 
under the traditional physical trespass theory of a search.25 However, separate 
concurrences by Justices Alito and Sotomayor collectively garnered the support 
 
from an aircraft); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (using the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test to determine that a warrantless aerial search of the defendant’s fenced backyard was 
unreasonable); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding that passengers in a getaway car did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their belongings located inside the car since they had 
“neither a property nor a possessory interest” in the vehicle). 
 15. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 16. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012). 
 17. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35; see also Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 
900 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2018) (“What’s more, the data collected by Naperville can be used to draw 
the exact inference that troubled the Court in Kyllo. . . . In fact, the data collected by Naperville could 
prove even more intrusive.”). 
 18. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14. 
 19. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 
(2012). 
 20. Id. at 558 (“[T]he whole of one’s movements is not exposed constructively even though each 
individual movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than 
does the sum of its parts.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 563–64 (“Society recognizes Jones’s expectation of privacy in his movements over the 
course of a month as reasonable, and the use of the GPS device to monitor those movements defeated 
that reasonable expectation.”). 
 23. Id. at 563 (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp. 255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J., 
concurring)). 
 24. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 25. Id. at 404–05. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, held that the installation of a 
continuous GPS monitoring device on Jones’s vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment because 
installation of the device constituted a physical trespass—focusing on the “installation” of the device 
itself rather than the substance of the data it collected. Id. at 402, 404–05. 
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of a majority of the Supreme Court Justices.26 These concurrences upheld the 
root of the Maynard decision—that the data collection in the aggregate was a 
Fourth Amendment violation because the continuous collection of information 
violated the reasonable expectation of privacy test.27 
The Maynard decision and Jones concurrences gave credence to the 
“Mosaic Theory,” which posits that “individual pieces of otherwise unimportant 
information, when grouped together, can amount to important intelligence 
information that requires high-level confidential treatment.”28 Since Maynard 
and Jones, courts have grappled with how to operationalize the Mosaic Theory. 
The Jones concurrences acknowledge that their conclusions fail to create a 
precise formula as to when technological surveillance crosses the threshold of 
unreasonableness, but these cases present “an encouraging step toward a more 
contextual approach to digital privacy.” 29  In particular, the Katz-to-Jones 
evolution indicates that social norms are critical to evaluating the strength of an 
individual’s privacy interest by focusing on places in which society is unwilling 
to accept government searches. 
With this background established, the following part explores a new 
technology to which Fourth Amendment principles are being applied—electric 
smart meters. It then addresses the Seventh Circuit’s dismissal of privacy 
concerns regarding the government’s unfettered access to smart meter data. 
II.  ELECTRIC SMART METERS AND NAPERVILLE’S REASONABLENESS 
CONCLUSIONS 
The critical point of contention in Naperville involved a municipally 
owned electric utility’s modernization efforts.30 Using a federal grant aimed at 
 
 26. See id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito’s 
concurrence—which garnered the support of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan—focused 
exclusively on how the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy “were violated by the long-term 
monitoring of the movements of the vehicle [the defendant] drove” and argued that the majority’s 
focus on the physical trespass was “highly artificial.” Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence supported the majority’s use of the physical trespass test but also noted that 
the use of the long-term GPS monitoring device violated Jones’s expectation of privacy. Id. at 414–15 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive 
record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”). 
 28. Jessica Gutierrez-Alm, The Privacies of Life: Automatic License Plate Recognition Is 
Unconstitutional Under the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy Law, 38 HAMLINE L. REV. 127, 
142–43 (2015). 
 29. Natasha H. Duarte, The Home out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law 
Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1140, 1143 (2015). 
 30. It is important to note that the governance of the utility is critically important for purposes 
of this Recent Development. Since the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches conducted by the government, had the residents of Naperville received their electricity from a 
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improving electricity grid resilience, Naperville’s government-owned utility 
installed electric smart meters into all residential homes.31 Although the case 
centered around one city’s use of smart meters, the City of Naperville is part of 
a more widespread movement to incorporate these devices into the electricity 
grid. This part contextualizes the case by first exploring the functionality of 
smart meters and their relevance to efficiency and modernization efforts in the 
electric power sector. It then examines the arguments presented in Naperville. 
A. Electric Smart Meters and the Smart Grid Transition 
Electric smart meters are distinct from traditional analog meters because 
they facilitate a digital two-way communication between a customer’s home and 
the utility.32 This allows the utility to remotely collect electricity-consumption 
data from an individual’s home at regular intervals throughout the day, whereas 
analog meters only furnish data on the total energy consumption for the prior 
billing period and require a utility employee to physically travel to each 
customer’s home to record consumption information for monthly bill 
purposes. 33  Smart meters are seen as a critical tool in transitioning into a 
modern “smart grid” because the near real time data generated by the meters 
poses several efficiency benefits. 34  Primarily, customers’ granular energy 
consumption data can be made available to them, permitting those consumers 
to adjust their daily use habits in order to create personal cost savings, while 
also increasing the energy efficiency of the utility grid at large. 35  This is 
particularly relevant during peak usage times when a utility would traditionally 
turn on “peaker” plants—energy plants reserved exclusively for high-demand 
times.36 These plants are incredibly expensive to run and often spew greenhouse 
gases into low-income communities, raising both cost efficiency and 
 
privately owned electric utility, then the application of the Fourth Amendment would be distinctly 
different. In that instance, the connection to government access would be more attenuated, and other 
Fourth Amendment principles such as the third-party doctrine would apply. See Naperville Smart 
Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Before continuing, we 
address one wrinkle to the search analysis. Naperville argues that the third-party doctrine renders the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections irrelevant here. . . . This argument is unpersuasive. . . . There is no 
third party involved in the exchange.”). For an application of the Fourth Amendment to smart meter 
data owned by private utilities, see generally Sarah Murphy, Note, Watt Now? Smart Meter Data Post-
Carpenter, 61 B.C. L. REV. 785 (2020). 
 31. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 524. 
 32. See Hayden McGovern, What Is a Smart Meter?, SMART ENERGY (Dec. 16, 2016), https:// 
www.smartenergy.com/what-is-a-smart-meter/ [http://perma.cc/5SCY-K8KW]. 
 33. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT: 2018 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 13 (2018) [hereinafter SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT]. 
 34. See SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 33, at 11. 
 35. The Benefits of Smart Meters, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
general.aspx?id=4853 [https://perma.cc/M7AE-JALT]. 
 36. See id. 
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environmental justice concerns. 37 However, because smart meters provide a 
utility with constant data on consumer use, the utility can leverage efficiency 
programs such as time-of-use rates to incentivize consumers to lower their 
personal electricity use during peak times, reducing the need for the high-cost 
plants.38 
Further, the data generated by smart meters contains far more information 
than just a general description of a consumer’s overall electricity use. All 
appliances and other electricity-dependent products in our homes contain 
specific load signatures, meaning these objects use electricity in such distinct 
ways that the electric utility can identify specifically what type of activity is 
occurring within a household at any given time.39 Thus, a trained eye could 
evaluate which households on a city block prefer taking showers in the morning, 
which eat microwave meals for every dinner, or what day of the week a family 
washes all their laundry.40 This kind of continuous, granular data collection 
allows a utility to adjust its power output in a significantly more efficient 
manner than a traditional analog meter, converting the retrospective process of 
examining energy use, monitoring outages, and adjusting power sources into a 
substantially more responsive process. 41  Because smart meters provide 
numerous benefits for utilities, their use has exploded in the United States in 
the last decade. In fact, by 2030, ninety-three percent of all U.S. customers are 
expected to be connected to their electricity provider with a smart meter.42 
B. Naperville and Fourth Amendment Concerns 
Given the significant advantages from both an administrative and energy 
efficiency perspective, it is of little surprise that the City of Naperville was a 
willing participant in smart meter adoption. However, although smart meters 
 
 37. See PEAK COAL., DIRTY ENERGY, BIG MONEY: HOW PRIVATE COMPANIES 
MAKE BILLIONS FROM POLLUTING FOSSIL FUEL PEAKER PLANTS IN NEW YORK CITY’S 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES—AND HOW TO CREATE A CLEANER, MORE 
JUST ALTERNATIVE 5 (2020), https://www.cleanegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Dirty-Energy-Big-
Money.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT7Q-NJZY] (“Over the last decade, an estimated $4.5 billion of 
ratepayer money—in the form of what are called ‘capacity payments’—have gone to the owners of the 
city’s peaker plants, simply to keep peakers online in case they may be needed.”); PSE HEALTHY 
ENERGY, CALIFORNIA PEAKER POWER PLANTS: ENERGY STORAGE REPLACEMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2020), https://www.psehealthyenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ 
California.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WRH-E89X] (“Half of [California’s peaker plants] are located in 
areas designated as disadvantaged communities by the state of California due to high cumulative 
socioeconomic, environmental, and health burdens.”). 
 38. See The Benefits of Smart Meters, supra note 35. 
 39. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42338, SMART METER DATA: PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY 
3–5 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42338.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KHT-6WE7]. 
 40. For a striking visual depiction of how load signatures reveal a household’s specific activities, 
see id. at 5 fig.I. 
 41. See SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT, supra note 33, at 27. 
 42. Id. at 30 fig.10. 
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are largely praised as necessary tools in shifting to a cleaner and more efficient 
electricity grid, Naperville highlights the imminent concerns that emerge when 
these data-mining tools are operated by a government-owned electric utility. 
The digital meters installed in Naperville allowed the municipal utility to 
remotely capture energy consumption data from residents at fifteen-minute 
intervals and store this data for three years. 43  The 148,000 residents of 
Naperville44 were not allowed to opt out of smart meters45 but were instead 
provided with a Smart Grid Bill of Rights that ensured the data would not be 
distributed to third parties absent a warrant.46 In 2015, Naperville Smart Meter 
Awareness (“NPSA”), a nonprofit organization formed by the residents of 
Naperville, brought suit against the utility alleging Fourth Amendment 
violations emerging from the utility’s unfettered access to such personal data.47 
The federal district court dismissed the claims, and NPSA appealed.48 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by establishing that the use of smart 
meter data constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.49 While not a 
physical search in the traditional sense, the nature of the data collection 
facilitated the government’s ability to “explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”50 The court then 
proceeded to evaluate the reasonableness of the search by balancing the 
intrusion on individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of 
legitimate government interests.51 
 
 43. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2018). 
Utilities can choose the intervals at which they collect data and store it. Other utilities may, and do, 
use more frequent time intervals to transmit the consumption data from the meter. See McGovern, 
supra note 32. 
 44. About Naperville, CITY NAPERVILLE, https://www.naperville.il.us/about-naperville/ [https:// 
perma.cc/5G29-X2R9]. 
 45. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 524. The City of Naperville utility generally collects electricity-
consumption data via radio frequency communication. Individuals are permitted to opt out of 
automated data collection but still must pay both an installation and monthly fee for the service. 
Nonetheless, even when opting out of the radio frequencies, the smart meters still capture data at the 
same fifteen-minute intervals and provide the utility with the same information when the data is 
physically retrieved. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 114 F. Supp. 3d 606, 
609 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 46. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 528; NAPERVILLE, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-0.5-2(2)(E) 
(LEXIS through Ordinance No. 21-007). Notably, the Smart Grid Bill of Rights begins by asserting 
that data will categorically not be released to third parties, but in a later bullet point clarifies that third-
party access would be granted via a warrant, court order, or customer consent. Id. For a discussion as 
to why the Smart Grid Bill of Rights does not damper Fourth Amendment concerns, see infra Section 
III.A.2. 
 47. Naperville, 114 F. Supp. 3d. at 608–09. 
 48. Id. at 612–13. 
 49. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. 
 50. Id. at 526 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)). 
 51. Id. at 528. 
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Because smart meter installation was not inherently related to 
prosecutorial actions, the court’s analysis of individual privacy interests was 
based solely on a comparison between Naperville’s data collection and 
jurisprudence on administrative searches within the Fourth Amendment 
context.52 The Seventh Circuit drew a distinction between the data collection 
in Naperville and an administrative search for building code compliance. 
Because the data collection did not require physical entry into an individual’s 
home, as was the case with administrative searches, the court characterized it as 
“minimally invasive.” 53 Moreover, unlike administrative searches where the 
fruits of the search could immediately result in a criminal citation, smart meter 
usage lacked an immediate risk of corollary criminal implications, which in the 
eyes of the court, attenuated the connection between privacy expectations and 
electricity usage.54 And finally, when the seemingly innocent data collection was 
viewed in combination with the city’s Smart Grid Bill of Rights, consumer 
privacy interests were “more limited.”55 
Despite accounting for the potential dangers of the data collection within 
its determination that smart meter usage constituted a search, the court did not 
extend this analysis in evaluating the strength of an individual’s privacy interest 
while determining the reasonableness of the search. Instead, after noting the 
distinctions between the data collection and administrative searches, the court 
acknowledged the government’s substantial interest in collecting the 
information.56 Thus, the “minimally invasive” search in comparison to national 
grid modernization goals heavily tipped the scales in favor of the City of 
Naperville, overcoming the presumption of unreasonableness.57 
III.  NAPERVILLE’S “PROSECUTORIAL INTENT” INQUIRY SHORT-CIRCUITED 
PROPER ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF THE SEARCH 
The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion of reasonableness was based on an 
incomplete assessment of the nature of electric smart meter data collection and 
failed to account for critical similarities between the Naperville search and 
modern Fourth Amendment precedent. This sparse inquiry overlooked critical 
privacy interests implicated in the search. The following sections first explore 
how Naperville’s exclusive focus on prosecutorial intent mischaracterized the 
role smart meter data plays in modern criminal cases and then identifies the 
 
 52. Id.; United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that administrative 
searches are those that are “conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme, done in furtherance of 
administrative goals rather than to secure evidence of a crime”). 
 53. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 529. 
 54. Id. at 528–29. 
 55. Id. at 528. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 529. 
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gaping holes in the court’s analysis by pinpointing critical Fourth Amendment 
considerations the court overlooked. 
A. Sitting in the Dark: Naperville’s Deficient Comparison to Administrative 
Searches 
While Naperville was unique from traditional Fourth Amendment search 
cases because the search was conducted outside of a criminal context, the 
noncriminal nature of a search does not lessen an individual’s interest in 
ensuring intimate details of their life are free from governmental intrusion.58 
However, the fact that the search was conducted without prosecutorial intent 
was the crux upon which the Naperville court fastened its conclusion that the 
government’s interest in the data was greater than an individual’s interest in 
retaining their confidentiality—and served as the court’s only analysis into 
individual privacy interests.59 
1.  Camara Prescribes a More Thorough Evaluation of Privacy Interests 
The Naperville court relied on Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco60 
for its assertion that a lack of prosecutorial intent justified a reduction in an 
individual’s privacy interest.61 In Camara, an individual living in an apartment 
refused to allow a building code inspector to enter his home without a warrant, 
resulting in the city issuing him a criminal citation.62 The Supreme Court found 
that warrantless administrative searches were unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment because an individual’s privacy interests in the sanctity of their 
home exceeded even a government’s desire to prevent devastating “fires and 
epidemics.”63 Instead, the probable cause standard and the “warrant machinery” 
would ensure inspections protected individuals’ privacy expectations.64 
The Seventh Circuit distinguished the search in Naperville from the search 
in Camara by contrasting the likelihood of criminal prosecution between 
building code inspections and smart meter usage. Camara, however, prescribed 
a more thorough method of incorporating this factor into Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness conclusions. In its opinion, the Camara Court did assert that a 
 
 58. See David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not To Think About Privacy and the 
Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1120 (2014) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine any delineation 
of the private sphere that does not include a space for intimacy: not just for physical intimacy, but for 
expressing thoughts and feelings to oneself and to one’s intimate acquaintances without sharing them 
with the world. Some forms of electronic monitoring seem inconsistent with respect for any such 
space.”); supra text accompanying notes 49–52; infra text accompanying notes 61–63. 
 59. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 528. 
 60. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 61. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 528. 
 62. Camara, 387 U.S. at 525. 
 63. Id. at 535. 
 64. Id. at 532–33. 
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search conducted without prosecutorial intent renders it a “less hostile 
intrusion.”65 However, the Court also stated that the ability of the government 
to leverage platonic administrative searches for future prosecution was 
significant and that “it is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his 
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the 
individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”66 Accordingly, the discussion in 
Camara regarding the lack of prosecutorial intent was merely the beginning of 
its analysis of privacy interests. The Supreme Court still proceeded in a lengthy 
assessment of individual interests in retaining privacy within their homes, even 
from building code inspectors seeking to prevent significant community harm.67 
In Camara, the Court addressed the government’s assertion that warrants 
were unnecessary for building code inspections because the search was crafted 
to “make the least possible demand” on occupants,68 the ordinances authorizing 
these inspections were “hedged with safeguards,”69 and the policy reasoning 
behind the inspections made them ill-suited for review by a magistrate in order 
to obtain a warrant. 70  All of these justifications for bypassing a warrant 
requirement fell short because they “unduly discount[ed] the purposes behind 
the warrant machinery.”71 Instead, a warrantless system would render occupants 
subject to the total discretion of the inspector, and “[t]his is precisely the 
discretion to invade private property which [the Court] ha[s] consistently 
circumscribed.” 72 A warrant issued by a neutral, detached magistrate would 
ensure that the searches were sufficiently tailored to serve the inspection’s 
purpose and actually necessary—not subject to the whims of an interested party. 
In stark contrast to the Camara Court, the Naperville court used the 
platonic nature of the search as a method of discrediting an individual’s privacy 
interest, without ever exploring what privacy interests were actually 
implicated.73 In reality, the Court’s decision in Camara bolsters the idea that a 
prosecutorial-intent inquiry is properly addressed separately from an evaluation 
of the relative significance of both an individual’s and the government’s 
interests. In this way, the prosecutorial-intent inquiry is used as a balancing tool 
 
 65. Id. at 530. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 529–30. 
 68. Id. at 531 (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 531–32. 
 71. Id. at 532. 
 72. Id. at 532–33. 
 73. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 
2018). 
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to discern the depth of personal interests rather than as a weapon to wholly 
dismiss community privacy fears.74 
2.  Naperville Overlooked the Connection Between Smart Meter Data and 
Potential Criminal Implications 
Although Camara dictates a more thorough analysis of privacy interests, 
some might argue that Naperville is properly distinguished since the 
administrative search in Camara had a direct possibility of ending in a criminal 
citation.75 Indeed, as the Naperville court notes, “using too much electricity is 
not yet a crime”76 and the city’s Smart Grid Bill of Rights seems to inoculate 
against any concerns regarding improper usage. However, the crux of Camara 
was that a lack of prosecutorial intent is not conclusive in Fourth Amendment 
analysis.77 Moreover, the Naperville court itself admitted earlier in its opinion 
that an inferential step from a nonprosecutorial search to one relating to a 
criminal proceeding does not render the search outside the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections.78 
Further, when viewed in context, the line between the city’s platonic use 
of smart meter data and law enforcement is flimsy. Namely, the city’s Smart 
Grid Bill of Rights is not the emblem of privacy protection that the Naperville 
court makes it out to be.79 The document itself merely asserts the municipality’s 
intent to protect consumer data 80 but lacks any actual Fourth Amendment 
implications if the city breaks its own promises. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
routinely upheld searches under the Fourth Amendment despite the searches 
 
 74. It is important to note that Camara was decided in May 1967, whereas Katz was decided in 
December 1967, meaning that Camara Court’s prosecutorial-intent analysis was not originally designed 
to be used within the reasonable expectation of privacy test because the test did not exist until half a 
year later when Katz was decided. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (introducing the reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 75. Camara, 387 U.S. at 531. 
 76. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 528. 
 77. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530–31 (“[E]ven the most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible 
interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official 
authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to 
personal and family security.”); see also Maximilian Sladek de la Cal, City of Los Angeles v. Patel: The 
Fourth Amendment’s “Special Needs” in the Information Age, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1137, 1141 (2016). 
 78. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526. 
 79. Id. at 528 (“And Naperville’s amended ‘Smart Grid Customer Bill of Rights’ clarifies that the 
city’s public utility will not provide customer data to third parties, including law enforcement, without 
a warrant or court order. Thus, the privacy interest at stake here is yet more limited than that at issue 
in Camara.”). 
 80. See NAPERVILLE, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 8-0.5-2(2)–(4) (LEXIS through Ordinance 
No. 21-007). 
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violating narrower local law.81 Because the Fourth Amendment functions as a 
constitutional minimum, Naperville and other cities and states are free to 
impose additional standards, the violation of which will be irrelevant to a 
Fourth Amendment inquiry.82 In this instance, because the Seventh Circuit 
upheld the city’s data collection as a reasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment,83 if future well-intentioned city officials feel compelled to diverge 
from the Smart Grid Bill of Rights in response to pleas from law enforcement 
to assist in the conviction of an individual, the Fourth Amendment would be of 
no assistance to Naperville residents.84 Instead, the city’s decision to leverage 
their data for criminal purposes would leave customers with no constitutional 
recourse. 
Notably, the previous hypothetical regarding the use of electricity data to 
convict a person is not a far-fetched example. Electricity consumption data has 
become increasingly valuable to government agencies for use in criminal 
prosecutions, particularly in federal drug investigations. 85  For example, 
heightened electricity usage can indicate that a resident is using high-wattage 
grow lights to grow marijuana. 86  In fact, law enforcement agencies have 
explicitly acknowledged the importance of this data for discovering grow 
operations when traditional investigative methods fail to reveal any evidence of 
a crime.87 Strikingly, too, collecting smart meter data typically only requires a 
subpoena, not a warrant, which means the agency need only have a reasonable 
belief that criminal activity has occurred, significantly lowering the threshold 
 
 81. See generally Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (upholding the conviction of a defendant 
whose arrest for a suspended driver’s license was contrary to state law because the seizure was still 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (affirming 
the reasonableness of a vehicle stop by plainclothes officers in an unmarked car despite D.C. regulations 
prohibiting these kinds of stops); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (reversing the state court’s 
determination that violation of state law during a vehicle seizure was also a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 82. See Moore, 553 U.S. at 171 (“Our decisions counsel against changing [our Fourth Amendment 
inquiry] when a State chooses to protect privacy beyond the level that the Fourth Amendment requires. 
We have treated additional protections exclusively as a matter of state law.”). 
 83. See supra Section I.B. 
 84. It takes little imagination to envision a situation in which the local police approach the city 
with a plea to hand over data under the guise of public safety and the city bending to the wishes of the 
law enforcement agency. 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(sustaining the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s subpoena of electricity consumption data 
from three residents served by an electric cooperative for use in a drug investigation). 
 86. Dean Narciso, Police Seek Utility Data for Homes of Marijuana-Growing Suspects, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Feb. 28, 2011, 12:01 AM), https://www.dispatch.com/article/20110228/news/302289766 
[https://perma.cc/BQ5D-7KS7]. 
 87. Id. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1141 (2021) 
1154 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99-4 
for the government.88 One investigator even recognized the increasing value of 
smart meter data specifically for its ability to provide details traditionally 
unknown to police outside a warrant—“How else can I get an indicator to get 
probable cause if I can’t see anything?”89 In effect, smart meter data allows 
government agencies to turn mere hunches about criminal activity into full-
blown investigations. These tactics are not foolproof either—innocuous, 
noncriminal activity can also be implicated in these searches. In 2011, a federal 
investigator revealed to state law enforcement that what the detectives believed 
to be a “major grow operation” based off of utility records actually ended up 
being a man’s at-home business involving numerous high-wattage computer 
servers.90 
Importantly, these are not obscure policing strategies. In 2011, at least 
sixty subpoenas per month were filed in Ohio requesting energy-use records 
from residents.91 More recently, in 2017, Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”), the 
country’s largest utility, 92  received 343 demands from legal entities for 
customer data records that covered approximately 125,800 residents. 93 
Although PG&E is a privately owned utility (in contrast to government-owned 
utilities like the one in Naperville) and requires a warrant to access the data,94 
these examples highlight the burgeoning demand for information. Moreover, 
the growing requests for smart meter data provide significant opportunities for 
abuse in government-owned utilities when there is no barrier between 
electricity consumption data and unfettered government access—because the 
utility company and the government are part of the same entity. Thus, not only 
is there a plausible connection between smart meter data and criminal 
implications, but the government is also already weaponizing this essential 
 
 88. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 801–03 (describing instances of law enforcement using 
subpoenas to gather electricity consumption data); id. at 799–800 (“An important distinction between 
subpoenas and warrants is that warrants always require a showing of probable cause, whereas subpoenas 
require a lower burden of proof.”); see also United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) 
(“[T]he very purpose of requesting the information [via subpoena] is to ascertain whether probable 
cause exists.”); Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1113–14 (“We ‘must enforce administrative subpoenas unless 
the evidence sought by the subpoena is plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the 
agency.’” (quoting EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001))). 
 89. Narciso, supra note 86. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The 5 Largest Utilities in the U.S., SAVEONENERGY (Jan. 31, 2020), https:// 
www.saveonenergy.com/learning-center/post/top-5-utilities-in-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/5Y62-64BV]. 
 93. PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., SMART GRID ANNUAL PRIVACY REPORT 2017, at tbl.1 (2017), 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=6442457990 [https://perma.cc/5L3L-6JBH] (choose “2017” 
from “PG&E”). 
 94. Notice of Accessing, Collecting Storing, Using and Disclosing Energy Usage Information, PG&E, 
https://www.pge.com/en_US/about-pge/company-information/privacy-policy/energy-usage-
information/energy-usage-information.page [https://perma.cc/XS34-JDB9] (last updated Jan. 1, 
2020). 
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service against individuals whose only method of avoiding monitoring would 
be to live off the grid entirely. 
B. Turning the Lights On: A Proper Analysis of Individual Privacy Interests in 
Smart Meter Data 
In addition to its failure to approach smart meter data in a contextualized 
manner, the Naperville court relied solely on its prosecutorial-intent inquiry in 
reasoning that customers had diminished privacy interests.95 It conducted no 
analysis into the intrusiveness of the search, whereas Fourth Amendment 
precedent is ripe with analogous technological search examples, all of which are 
objectively less intrusive than smart meter data and pose less risk to individuals 
in terms of the information they can provide the government. For example, 
United States v. Karo96 found that the use of electronic “beepers” on a shipment 
of supplies that then entered a private residence violated the privacy interests 
of those inside.97 Similarly, Kyllo v. United States98 concluded that the use of 
thermal-imaging devices on a private residence that provided “relatively 
crude”99 heat imagery was an unreasonable search.100 Riley v. California101 even 
established that text messages, call logs, photos, and videos contained on a cell 
phone collected after a lawful physical search could not be examined absent a 
warrant. 102  All of these technological examples would have provided 
government entities with significantly less granular information than smart 
meters, but all of them were deemed unreasonable because of the privacy 
principles implicated. 
Even more striking, under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, 
the Supreme Court has come to recognize that as technology becomes ingrained 
into every crevice of our lives, the Fourth Amendment must accommodate the 
reality that individuals are often helpless to live their lives without it. Carpenter 
v. United States103 is enigmatic of this principle. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court 
held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site 
location information (“CSLI”) furnished by his cell phone carrier to the 
government that included “12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s 
 
 95. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 96. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 97. Id. at 717. 
 98. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 99. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526. 
 100. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 101. 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 102. See id. at 401. 
 103. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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movements over 127 days” without a warrant.104 For the Court, the fact that 
Carpenter had, in effect, surrendered this information to his cell phone provider 
was irrelevant because “cell phones and the services they provide are ‘such a 
pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to 
participation in modern society.”105 Cell phones are now in essence a “feature 
of human anatomy,” and the Supreme Court recognized the need to account for 
their pervasiveness.106 
If cell phones are categorized as essential to modern life under Carpenter, 
then electricity is undoubtedly even more indispensable to present-day living 
because cell phones themselves are reliant on electricity. Further, the first 
iPhone was released in 2007, 107  whereas Thomas Edison patented the 
incandescent lightbulb in 1880,108 and the level at which each is embedded into 
everyday life is similarly disparate. While life would be incredibly inconvenient 
without a cell phone, a single day without electricity would place the health and 
safety of millions of individuals in jeopardy. Life-saving medical devices, 109 
refrigeration, 110  heating and air conditioning, 111  and numerous other 
technologies that provide for essential human activity are dependent on reliable 
electricity. One need to only look to the devastating consequences imposed by 
power outages during extreme weather events to fully comprehend the degree 
 
 104. Id. at 2209, 2219. Cell-site location information can provide the government with a detailed 
account of where an individual was located at specific times because “[e]ach time the phone connects 
to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record.” Id. at 2211. Most cell phones “tap into the wireless 
network several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner is not using one of the 
phone’s features.” Id. 
 105. Id. at 2210 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385). 
 106. Riley, 573 U.S. at 385. 
 107. Steve Jobs Debuts the iPhone, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/steve-
jobs-debuts-the-iphone [https://perma.cc/CX5Q-FM8X] (Jan. 7, 2020). 
 108. History of Electricity, INST. FOR ENERGY RSCH., https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/ 
history-electricity/ [https://perma.cc/2PD7-PJXW]. 
 109. See PAC. ADA CTR., EMERGENCY POWER PLANNING FOR PEOPLE WHO USE 
ELECTRICITY AND BATTERY DEPENDENT ASSISTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND MEDICAL DEVICES 
1 (2014), https://www.pge.com/pge_global/common/pdfs/safety/electrical-safety/electric-generator-
safety/Pacific-ADA-Centers-Emergency-Power-Planning-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5QS-
QNFC] (providing an emergency preparedness checklist for individuals who use essential medical 
devices in their homes in case of a power outage). 
 110. See Food Safety for Power Outages, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/food-safety-during-a-power-outage.html [https://perma.cc/7AYG-
PAMB] (last updated Sept. 8, 2020) (providing guidance for how to determine whether refrigerated 
food is unsafe after a power outage). 
 111. See Hot Weather Safety for Older Adults, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: NAT’L INST. 
ON AGING, https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/hot-weather-safety-older-adults [https://perma.cc/R2VF-
78D9] (last updated June 15, 2016) (listing potential health consequences for elderly people who are 
exposed to extreme heat conditions during warm-weather months). 
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to which human life depends on it. 112 Under this perspective, the need for 
electricity is undeniable, and absent additional governmental protections, 
people are forced to choose between living in a modern society or safeguarding 
their most private moments—a balancing that the Court repudiated in 
Carpenter.113 Further, the data collection in Naperville poses an even greater risk 
to individuals than the CSLI data collection in Carpenter, simply because it is 
the government itself that collects it—not a disinterested third party.114 Thus, 
as in Carpenter, courts must recognize that the data generated by electric meters, 
which sustains basic human functions, should be properly shielded from the 
government under the traditional warrant machinery. 
IV.  AN APPROPRIATE FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS REQUIRES 
CONSIDERATION OF THE LOCATION AND NATURE OF THE SEARCH 
In anchoring its reasonableness conclusions on the lack of prosecutorial 
intent, the Seventh Circuit deflected in its duty to examine the significant 
privacy interests implicated in smart meter data collection. Specifically, it 
downplayed two critical aspects of the data collection—its use within the home 
and the longitudinal nature of the search. The following sections explore each 
in turn. 
A. Naperville Failed To Address the Significance of Searches Within the Home 
Naperville’s reasonableness assessment most prominently omits any 
mention of the critical fact that the city’s smart meter data is collected from a 
person’s private residence. In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, “the home is 
first among equals”115 and the private affairs of an individual within the home 
are granted unparalleled deference.116 The Naperville court correctly identifies 
 
 112. See Shawn Mulcahy, Many Texans Have Died Because of the Winter Storm. Just How Many Won’t 
Be Known for Weeks or Months, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/19/ 
texas-power-outage-winter-storm-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/RYH3-7TZR] (describing a variety of 
causes of death linked to Texas power outages including hypothermia and carbon monoxide poisoning); 
N’dea Yancey-Bragg, Family Suing Texas Utility Companies for $100M After 11-Year-old Boy Died Amid 
Power Failure, USA TODAY (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/02/ 
22/family-sues-ercot-entergy-boys-death-texas-power-outages/4538181001/ [https://perma.cc/EPU5-
2SQF] (detailing the plight of parents whose son died of suspected hypothermia during a Texas power 
outage). 
 113. Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“Apart from disconnecting the 
phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in 
no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive 
dossier of his physical movements.” (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979))). 
 114. McGovern, supra note 32 (“[T]hese [utility] companies aren’t doing anything other than 
reading your meter and providing you with the best service that they can. They also encrypt all of the 
data that is transmitted to and from these smart meters, making it difficult for third parties to access 
the information without consent.”). 
 115. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). 
 116. Anna Lvovsky, Fourth Amendment Moralism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1189, 1213–15 (2018). 
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that electric smart meter data is collected without prosecutorial intent, which, 
in the court’s view, lessens the significance of the intrusion.117 However, it is 
equally, if not more important, that the search is conducted within the home—
the most revered space in Fourth Amendment analysis. “The unpermitted entry 
into the household, the Court has declared, ‘is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’”118 
Unwarranted intrusions into the home are not only a significant 
oppression prohibited by the Fourth Amendment but arguably the central tenet 
around which its jurisprudence has been crafted. Indeed, “[a]t the very core [of 
the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home 
and there be free from governmental intrusion.”119 The protection of the home 
is so fundamental to the Fourth Amendment that “[w]ith few exceptions, the 
question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence 
constitutional must be answered no.”120 The primacy of the home is further 
highlighted in Fourth Amendment privacy cases where the reasonableness of 
an individual’s privacy interest in a particular space, whether the “curtilage” of 
their home121 or within a business operation,122 is gauged in reference to how 
similar the space is to an individual’s home. For example, in Oliver v. United 
States,123 the Supreme Court established that “[t]here is no societal interest” in 
respecting the privacy interests of those who conduct activities on privately 
owned “open fields” because expectations of privacy while cultivating crops are 
significantly different from expectations of privacy for “intimate activity” 
within the home.124 In contrast, the Court in Florida v. Jardines125 held that the 
use of drug-sniffing dogs on the front porch of the defendant’s house was a 
violation of the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy because “[t]he 
area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’ . . . . is ‘intimately 
linked to the home, both physically and psychologically.’”126 
Notably, the home has been revered as a sacred space, not solely in 
reference to an individual’s right to exclude others as a function of privacy and 
familial life, but as a reflection of an individual’s “unique property and 
sovereignty interests.”127 Thus, an individual’s right to maintain a home free 
 
 117. See supra Section III.A. 
 118. Lvovsky, supra note 116, at 1212 (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 
(1972)). 
 119. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
 120. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
 121. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). 
 122. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987). 
 123. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 124. Id. at 179–80. 
 125. 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
 126. Id. (first quoting Oliver v. United States, 446 U.S. 170, 180 (1984); and then quoting 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)). 
 127. Lvovsky, supra note 116, at 1213. 
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from governmental invasion is inherent to their citizenry. 128  Because the 
sanctity of the home is so fiercely protected in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and is deeply embedded in American society as a fundamental 
piece of identity, it is anomalous that Naperville made no assessment of it while 
balancing individuals’ privacy rights against governmental interests. 
B. Naperville Overlooked How Longitudinal Data Collection Heightens Privacy 
Concerns 
In addition to its failure to consider the primacy of the home in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Naperville court further departed from settled 
legal principles by asserting that smart meter data collection “is far less invasive 
than the prototypical Fourth Amendment search of a home.”129 In doing so, it 
failed to consider that longitudinal data collection compounds the intrusiveness 
of a search. With this omission, the Naperville court fatally downplayed the 
customers’ interest in privacy. 
As in Jones, the Naperville data collection constitutes a longitudinal search. 
Because every electricity-consuming device in our homes produces a unique 
load signature,130 a person examining the data can discern not only what time 
an individual took a shower or washed their dishes on a particular day, but also 
the time at which an individual has taken a shower every single day for the past 
year and what brand of electric water heater they use.131 Moreover, in controlled 
experiments, it has also been shown that smart meter data can reveal not only 
when a resident was watching television but also what they were watching.132 A 
prototypical Fourth Amendment search presents a snapshot in time of an 
individual’s private residence, belongings, or self, whereas electric smart meter 
data provides a vivid, detailed account of an individual’s regular habits.133 Thus, 
the Naperville court’s assertion that the data collection is “far less invasive”134 is 
directly contrary to the findings in Jones. In fact, the Naperville search is 
arguably even more invasive than the Jones search because it provides specific 
details as to the activities of those it monitors, 135  whereas the Jones search 
provided only locational data.136 
 
 128. See id. 
 129. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 130. See supra Section II.A. 
 131. See Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526; supra Section II.A. 
 132. See ULRICH GREVELER, PETER GLÖSEKÖTTER, BENJAMIN JUSTUS & DENNIS LOEHR, 
MULTIMEDIA CONTENT IDENTIFICATION THROUGH SMART METER POWER USAGE PROFILES 4 
fig.5, https://1lab.de/pub/ike2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPV3-AM78] (demonstrating the unique 
power-consumption data for movies such as Star Trek and Body of Lies). 
 133. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526. 
 134. Id. at 528. 
 135. See supra Section II.A. 
 136. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012). 
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In addition, the Naperville court made the distinction between electricity 
consumption data and other searches by noting that the use of smart meters is 
not a physical intrusion into someone’s home.137 This is a false equivalency. The 
assertion that electronic surveillance tools—which can reveal intimate details of 
an individual’s home—are less intrusive than physically entering an individual’s 
house is not supported by the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Indeed, under this flawed logic, all uses of technology would be 
immune to the Fourth Amendment simply because they do not require a 
physical entrance into a building—a conclusion wholly unsupported by the 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.138 Instead, the Supreme 
Court has explicitly stated that “property rights are not the sole measure of 
Fourth Amendment violations.”139 In Jones, Justice Sotomayor even asserted 
that the physical trespassory test constitutes “an irreducible constitutional 
minimum.”140 Thus, the physical invasion requirement is merely the floor, not 
the ceiling, and reducing Fourth Amendment searches to only cover physical 
invasions is “highly artificial.”141 Moreover, the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test indicates that the reasonableness of a search is gauged by what 
information is garnered by it and where it occurred, not the method in which it 
was conducted. 142  The Seventh Circuit’s rigid construction of the Fourth 
Amendment is exactly what the Supreme Court has fought against because it 
“leave[s] the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.”143 
Had the Naperville court proceeded in an appropriate analysis, it would 
have found that smart meter data collection is the functional equivalent of a 
physical entry into a resident’s private residence and therefore warranted a more 
thorough inquiry into the privacy risks it imposed on every resident in the City 
of Naperville. Moreover, as a passive search, data collection generally poses 
even more serious privacy risks to individuals because it is “detailed, 
 
 137. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 528 (noting that the search in Camara was distinct because physical 
entry into a home constitutes a “serious threat to personal and family security” (quoting Camara v. 
Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967))). 
 138. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 n.1 (2018) (“But while property rights 
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encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.” 144  Electronic data collection is 
dangerous for precisely the reason that Naperville dismissed it as a minor 
invasion—it provides information otherwise unknowable via a traditional 
search.145 This leaves greater potential for abuse by government officials146 and 
conjures images of a surveillance state, the result of “the dystopian vision of 
Orwell or Huxley.”147 
Compounding these oversights—the significance of the search being 
conducted in the home and the intrusiveness of aggregate data collection—the 
Naperville court deflected the opportunity to draw a bright-line rule in favor of 
privacy rights within our increasingly digitized society. 
V.  FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY PRINCIPLES REQUIRE SMART METER 
DATA TO REMAIN PRESUMPTIVELY OFF-LIMITS TO THE GOVERNMENT 
Courts are quick to defer the complex task of creating a concrete Fourth 
Amendment electronic-privacy framework to others. Namely, the Supreme 
Court has asserted that legislative bodies are best equipped to address privacy 
concerns that emerge from electronic monitoring devices. 148  Similarly, the 
Naperville court rested its reasonableness determination on the fact that the 
municipal utility had a Smart Grid Bill of Rights requiring that local law 
enforcement acquire a warrant prior to accessing the data.149 In addition, the 
Seventh Circuit limited its conclusion to the specific facts laid out before it.150 
It asserted that data collection at more frequent intervals might necessitate a 
different conclusion151 and even opined that the utility could circumvent future 
privacy issues by allowing customers to opt in to the smart meter program.152 
Obviously, courts are limited to solely adjudicating the cases before them 
and venturing into hypotheticals would be appropriately considered judicial 
activism. However, the fundamental right to privacy has been established as 
within the judiciary’s purview for generations via the “penumbra” found within 
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the U.S. Bill of Rights. 153 The invasive nature of smart meter data and its 
potential to significantly diminish privacy rights requires a bright-line Fourth 
Amendment rule. 
Moreover, the current Fourth Amendment privacy framework encourages 
judges to make value judgments—what is society willing to recognize as so 
fundamental as to be entirely off-limits by intrusion from the government?154 
In light of this, the current judicial hesitance to create a concrete privacy rule 
in reference to certain technology due to fears of the changing social and 
technological landscape is certainly misplaced, as the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test already mandates that courts make normative claims involving 
technology.155 
Under these background principles, the data garnered from electric smart 
meters is so deeply intimate and personal that it requires a Fourth Amendment 
rule excluding smart meter data from collection by the government absent a 
warrant or consent. This means that investor-owned utilities and electric 
cooperatives will be required to keep electricity-consumption data private 
absent express permission of individual customers, and that publicly owned 
utilities,156 such as the one in Naperville, will need to find an alternate method 
of collecting consumption data or include an opt-out provision.157 Importantly, 
there are viable alternative methods to collecting the granular data that do not 
jeopardize efficiency benefits. Government-run utilities can store their data off 
site via a third party158or leverage aggregation tools which anonymize the data 
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without sacrificing its value to the utility.159 Thus, the central purpose of smart 
meters is left intact, while privacy concerns are appropriately managed. 
Critics might assert that a sweeping ban on this type of data collection can 
lead to a slippery slope in which government agencies, such as the City of 
Naperville’s utility, are required to operate using obsolete technologies to avoid 
infringing on wide-sweeping privacy rights. This is a particularly salient 
consideration, as few might consider their electric utility company a major 
threat to their personal autonomy or freedom from government overreach. 
However, the inherent purpose of privacy concerns within the Fourth 
Amendment is to address the slippery slope problem—but in the other 
direction: “Privacy violations can train violators to depersonalize and 
dehumanize the individuals with whom they deal, and those are particularly 
dangerous habits and ways of thinking for governmental officers and agencies, 
because of the tools of coercion and violence they can lawfully employ.”160 In 
reality, establishing a bright-line ban on warrantless, nonconsensual collections 
of electricity consumption data staves off this problem—an absolute prohibition 
evades the shades-of-gray assessment that courts engage in when determining 
what time interval, or what level of access, tips such collection into an 
unreasonable search. 
Another potential criticism of an explicit warrant requirement is that it 
would inhibit effective policing. One might argue that only those who commit 
crimes in their homes should have any substantive fear of smart meter data 
collection. However, a warrant requirement does not keep government agencies 
from accessing these data—it just requires they demonstrate to a neutral, 
detached magistrate that they have probable cause.161 At its heart, the warrant 
requirement “is concerned with government power and its abuse, and a warrant 
requirement built on specificity and limited discretion is the means by which 
we have chosen to prevent such abuse.”162 Moreover, the Court has repudiated 
the concerns that warrants are unduly burdensome in nonemergency situations. 
In Johnson v. United States, 163  police received a confidential tip that the 
defendant was using narcotics in his hotel room and upon arrival to the room 
could smell “burning opium.”164 Acting on the tip and odor, police entered the 
room, confronted the occupants, and conducted a search.165 The Supreme Court 
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sharply rebuked the officers for failing to request a warrant prior to entry.166 In 
its opinion, the Court stated: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its 
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.167 
Moreover, the assumption that only criminals need be concerned about an 
overreaching government with unrestricted access to our homes contains a 
misguided view of the accuracy of policing. The sheer amount of wrongfully 
convicted individuals across the country attests to the strong possibility that 
evidence collected against innocent individuals can, and is, still being 
weaponized to convict them. Since 1989, 2,720 individuals have been 
exonerated of crimes in the United States.168 Of these individuals, 663 of these 
false convictions had been at least partly based on false or misleading forensic 
evidence, 169 and 1,488 were convicted based on official misconduct, such as 
failure by the police or prosecutor to release exculpatory evidence to the 
defense.170 Although police are not directly responsible for convictions, their 
work is critical to any conviction, and their policing tactics directly impact the 
availability of reliable evidence that leads to criminal charges. Recognizing that 
police agencies are composed of human beings capable of error, a warrant 
requirement adds an additional layer of protection and serves the Fourth 
Amendment purpose of “plac[ing] obstacles in the way of a too permeating 
police surveillance.”171 
Finally, it is important to note that the Naperville court was correct in its 
assessment of the government’s heightened need for smart meter data. Grid 
modernization efforts, as well as climate change goals, are heavily dependent on 
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granular consumption data, allowing utilities to better prepare for weather-
related disruptions, prevent blackouts, adopt renewable technologies, and 
provide consumers with access to their own usage to facilitate efficiency 
efforts. 172 However, just as society understands that restricting use of other 
surveillance tools in the Fourth Amendment context does not compromise 
legitimate law enforcement or administrative agency goals, 173  grid 
modernization efforts and the use of smart meter installations are not mutually 
exclusive with ensuring adequate privacy and Fourth Amendment guarantees. 
Technology is adaptable to constitutional mandates, but fundamental rights are 
inalienable.174 
CONCLUSION 
The Naperville court departed from well-established Fourth Amendment 
privacy principles in its analysis of electric smart meters. Critical attributes of 
the data collection, including the collection’s longitudinal nature and the fact 
that the data captured intimate details from within the home, were entirely 
overlooked.175 The singular axis of analysis along which the court determined 
the validity of the search was that the search was conducted without 
prosecutorial intent. In the court’s view, this lack of intent heavily tipped the 
scales in favor of the government.176 This flawed analysis led to an outcome that 
poses significant threats to personal privacy in a data-dependent country. 
The Fourth Amendment has evolved from a property-based theory rooted 
in tangible concepts of tort and trespass177 to now account for searches that 
invade our most intimate spaces and deny us our sense of autonomy from the 
government.178 This evolution in the Fourth Amendment is a reflection of a 
greater technological revolution in which the government can search us and 
seize our property without a physical intrusion into our most protected 
spaces.179 Had the Naperville court properly assessed the interests of individuals 
in their privacy, it would have had to confront the ways in which smart meter 
data collection poses a substantial threat to privacy within the home—the most 
sacred space within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Properly addressing the 
data collection as a significant privacy intrusion would have necessitated that 
the court create a bright-line rule in regard to smart meter data collection. 
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This Recent Development proposes that the solution to electric smart 
meter data is an unambiguous Fourth Amendment rule prohibiting data 
collection that provides granular, individualized information about residents 
absent a warrant or consent. This would require government-owned utilities to 
outsource their data collection, leverage anonymization tools, or utilize other 
technological resources to ensure appropriate data privacy safeguards.180 These 
efforts will require forward-thinking leadership but need not inhibit grid 
modernization goals—a key factor in the court’s decision in Naperville.181 
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